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Abstract     
 
Purpose 
Problems arose in the ‘Market for information’ (MFI) during: the ‘dot.com’ boom; the Enron case; Northern Rock 
failure; and during the great financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-09. The paper seeks to extend understanding of the 
‘market for information’ through field research and theoretical sources. It seeks to understand the MFI during 
relatively stable periods and during periods of rapid change, crisis and failure.  It seeks to use these insights to 
propose changes to reduce the possibilities for negative change and problems in the MFI. 
 
Methods 
Field studies are used to develop an ‘empirical narrative’ for ongoing MFI structure, process and outcomes during 
relatively stable periods. The paper develops a ‘theoretical narrative’ to extend understanding of the MFI empirical 
insights 
 
Findings 
The paper reveals that MFI structure as: knowledge; and social context; is central to ongoing MFI economic 
processes for MFI agents. Outcomes include changes in markets, firms and others. Change and problems were means 
to understand interactions between MFI social structure, knowledge, actions and outcomes as they rendered visible 
the previously invisible. 
 
Originality, Implications 
The paper demonstrates that a coherent combination of new empirical narrative and theoretical narrative is essential 
to develop a critical stance, new policy prescriptions and new regulation to deal with problems and change in the 
MFI. This provides the frame to propose changes in the ‘world of knowledge’ and in (concentrated and elite) social 
and economic structures in the MFI. It proposes: making explicit shared knowledge in the MFI; monitoring of change 
processes: and promotion of active formal learning. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Section 2 briefly outlines literature on the idea of the MFI, recent problems, and aims of the paper.  Section 
3 outlines the research method. Section 4 begins with a brief summary of empirical and theoretical 
narratives used in the paper. These are developed in sections 5 and 6. Section 5 uses a range of historic 
field research studies to interpret economic, knowledge and social processes in production, exchange, and 
use of information between MFI agents. The latter focuses on company management, analysts and fund 
managers. Section 6 explores change in the MFI. Section 7 discusses major problems in MFI structure, 
knowledge and economic outcomes. It focuses on events such as the ‘dot.com’ boom, the Enron case, 
Northern Rock, and the great financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-09.  Both sections 6 and 7 make visible many 
interactions between MFI agents, social structure, knowledge, actions and outcomes.  Section 8 uses the 
theoretical frame or narrative developed in sections 5 and 6 to analyse MFI problems and failures outlined 
in section 7.  Section 9 argues that regulators, academics, and practitioners require: a conceptual frame 
based on empirical and theoretical narratives; to develop a critical stance; policy prescriptions; and 
regulation in the MFI.   
 
2. Literature, problem and aims 
 
Barker (1998) showed that the MFI was a hidden but substantial mechanism in the world of accounting and 
finance. It connected (information about) real companies (and their competitors and product/factor 
markets) to the stock market via information intermediaries such as analysts.  Prior studies showed how 
information was central to the finance system (Healy and Palepu, 2001). The MFI covered many 
companies, intermediaries, and financial institutions in connected world financial centres.  It was an 
intermediary mechanism to process, create and exchange information (about companies and their 
transactions) for various purposes such as corporate valuation, assurance, and accountability (Barker, 1998; 
Holland and Johanson 2003).   
       However, problems arose in the ‘Market for information’ (MFI) in the period 1998 to 2009 and these 
were contributors to problems in equity markets, major firms, information intermediaries and banks.  
Problems arose in MFI structure, knowledge and economic outcomes during events such as the ‘dot.com’ 
boom(Healy and Palepu, 2001), the Enron case (Healy and Palepu, 2003), Northern Rock (Fallon, 2015), 
and the great financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-09 (Holland, 2010).  Many of these problems arose during 
longer term MFI change processes and associated changes in real and financial markets for firms and 
banks. The problems became visible during major information and knowledge failures in the MFI during 
the major events noted above.  
      As a result, many problems have occurred in the world of finance and MFI since the seminal work of 
Barker (1998). This paper seeks to build on prior work and develop the idea of the MFI taking into account 
the many issues arising from 2000 onwards. The paper seeks to improve visibility and understanding of the 
‘market for information’ (MFI) through field research and theoretical sources. It seeks to understand the 
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MFI during relatively stable periods and during periods of rapid change, crisis and failure.  It seeks to use 
these insights to propose changes to reduce the possibilities for negative change and problems in the MFI. 
The development of more complete and critical theoretical framework matched to empirical insights is 
proposed as a key means to stimulate the debate and open up the private world of the MFI. 
 
3.  Research method 
 
     The paper identifies common themes across a related set of qualitative field based research studies 
(Barnett-Page and Thomas, 2009) in the world of information in finance. The themes and the links 
between them are used to develop an ‘empirical narrative’ (Golden-Biddle and Locke, 2007) for the MFI. 
This in turn provides an empirical focus for developing a theoretical narrative concerning the MFI. The 
field studies and narratives together provide a more complete explanatory framework to understand and 
critically analyse the MFI. 
     ‘Agents’ of interest in the MFI are primarily restricted to company management, analysts and fund 
managers. Given the scope of the MFI it is difficult to conceive of a single comprehensive field study to 
explore the nature of the MFI. However, many researchers have conducted field studies into specialist MFI 
information activities between 1990 and 2016 (see Table 1). The studies shared many common features, 
including using the same research setting in the form of the MFI to conduct field investigations of how 
specialist MFI agents produced, exchanged, and used information. The research studies involved collection 
and processing of similar qualitative data on MFI agents and using similar qualitative research methods. 
The common factors in field studies provide means to match ‘like’ with ‘like’ (Kearney, 1988) in 
comparisons and integration of the studies (Stoner et al, 2004; Barnett-Page and Thomas, 2009). The field 
studies reveal common themes across specialist MFI agents. These concern: the nature of information; 
specialist forms of information production and exchange; links between the agents and connected 
information tasks; use of each other’s information in  decisions  and outputs;  the role of knowledge and 
social contexts in MFI processes; and various outcomes. The scope of the analysis was limited to the MFI 
and its agents and firms as subsets of the world of finance.  For the benefit of simplicity and abstraction the 
finance social system and the associated MFI social sub-system were assumed, in section 5, to operate in a 
stable and semi-autonomous manner relative to a larger social system and economy.  Sections 6 and 7 
relax this assumption when dealing with change and major problems.  
    Golden-Biddle and Locke, (2007) distinguish between ‘field based stories’ and ‘theoretical stories’.  
‘Field based stories’ refers to empirical findings about changing information activities and information 
intermediation processes in the ‘market for information’ (MFI).   Analysis of the range of historic field 
research studies in table 1 was the basis to develop an ‘empirical narrative’ (Golden-Biddle et al, (2007) 
revealing links between the common themes identified for the MFI and its agents. The narrative concerns 
economic, knowledge and social processes in production, exchange, and use of information between MFI 
agents.  The narrative covers periods of relative stability, rapid change, and major problems and crisis from 
the 1990s to 2016. The empirical narrative provides a focus for developing a theoretical narrative 
4 
 
4 
 
concerning the MFI. The ‘theoretical story’ is based on existing theoretical conversations in a field and 
identifies the area of studies ‘to which researcher’s grounded theorizing can make a contribution’ (p122, 
Locke, 2001).This refers to a range of conventional literature and theory in finance, management, 
behaviour, sociology of finance, and institutional setting.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Empirical and Theoretical narratives 
Brief versions of MFI empirical narrative and theoretical narrative are developed in section 4 to provide a 
‘map’ to navigate the paper (Golden-Biddle and Locke, 2007).  Readers can get an early overview of the: 
richness of the data; overall empirical patterns; theoretical interpretation of how the MFI functioned in 
relatively stable periods; and how major problems and failures arose. The combination of empirical 
insights and appropriate theory is intended to enhance understanding, meaning, and power of critical 
analysis for those in this field.  It is intended to enhance trust and confidence for readers concerning 
judgements employed in interpreting cases and constructing an MFI empirical narrative. The aim was not 
to develop or test these theories, but to position the paper, its issues and empirical structure, relative to a 
wide range of relevant literature in a broader theory frame. The aim was demonstrate their collective 
power in interpreting the combined phenomena, and in contributing to further policy development.       
Empirical narrative about MFI structure, process and outcomes – in varying conditions  
The paper uses historic field studies by authors such as Barker (1998), Healy and Palepu (2003), Holland and 
Johanson (2003) and Holland (2004) as means to identify information related activities in the MFI. Figure 1 
illustrates how the MFI involved knowledge and social contexts in economic processes in production, 
exchange, and use of information between agents such as company management, analysts and fund managers.  
Information concerned, inter alia, ‘hard’ information (eg earnings estimates) and ‘soft’ information (eg 
company intangibles) used for assurance and valuation decisions.  Agent and parent firm knowledge were 
important resources available to MFI agents (Holland et al 2012). Information intermediation actions of MFI 
agents, teams and parent firms took place in social and knowledge contexts. Outcomes included changes in 
markets, networks, firms and others. 
                         Table 1    Field studies in the market for information – specialisms, structure, process, outcomes 
 
Field studies on corporate disclosure in the market for information.  
Gibbins et al (1990) - Holland (1996), Holland & Stoner (1996), Holland (1997), Holland (1998a), Holland (1998b) 
Holland (2005) , Holland (2009), Mayorga, (2013),  Chen, Danbolt, and Holland (2014) 
 
Field studies on fund manager research and role in the market for information.  
Holland (1995), Holland and Doran (1998), Holland (2002), Holland (2006), Roberts et al (2006), Henningsson (2009), 
 Barker et al (2012), Holland (et al 2012) ,Coleman (2014, 2015), Holland (2016),  Henningsson et al (2015) 
 
Field studies on sell side analyst research and disclosure in the market for information 
Barker 1998), Marston (2008), Holland et al (2014), Haig et al (2014), Maise (2014)  
Abhayawansa et al (2015) Imam & Spence (2015), Neville & Coughlan  (2015) 
 
Field studies and literature reviews on the broader idea of the market for information 
Barker (1998), Howcroft (2001),  Healy & Palepu (2001), Healy & Palepu (2003) , Holland (2003), Holland and Johanson 
(2003), Holland (2004), Palepu et al 2008, Preda (2005). 
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MFI structures and agents 
The field studies revealed that the MFI consisted of an informal structure of social networks of specialist 
information (production and use) firms and their agents (Holland, 2003; Holland and Johanson, 2003). The 
wider set of agents included: corporate executives and financial communications staff; analysts; fund 
managers; investment consultants; financial media; auditors; rating analysts; and regulators. The agents 
included individuals in teams, firms and MFI networks. They functioned in: investment banks; financial 
database firms; asset managers; news media firms; and regulators.  They operated in financial centres such as 
‘City’ of London, and ‘Wall St’ and had economic incentives to connect information production, exchange 
and use in financial centres and markets through social networks, organisational forms and technology.  
MFI processes and interactions  
Field studies have shown that the MFI and agents were: intermediary mechanisms connecting information 
about real companies to the stock market; in support of corporate valuation, assurance, and accountability 
decisions (Barker 1998, Holland and Johanson 2003).  MFI agent (information) actions within  various 
interactive MFI contexts (existing MFI structures, knowledge and their prior states) led to various 
consequences and outcomes (Holland and Johanson, 2003) in: the MFI and stock market; ‘finance and 
investment’ society; and on occasion ‘civil society’.  Economic processes in the form of: paid and unpaid 
information exchanges (private, public); and stock market reactions to public information and actions by MFIs 
agents; provided rapid feedback stimuli to agents during interactions. Time was an important dimension to the 
MFI process and interactions  and was manifest as: intense time pressures; the need for very fast response to 
events;  time to think and analyse; time to act in combined economic and social systems; ‘ordered’ time in 
terms of information related schedules; and accumulation of knowledge and problems over time. 
MFI change and problems 
         Change and major problems are important empirical means to make visible the previously invisible and 
hence: understand interactions between MFI social structure, knowledge, actions and outcomes; and extend the 
narrative.  In Section 6 the empirical narrative is developed using insights from longer term MFI change 
processes. Section 7 discusses major problems in MFI structure, knowledge and economic outcomes using 
events such as the ‘dot.com’ boom, the Enron case, Northern Rock, and the great financial crisis (GFC) of 
2007-09. These events vividly highlighted negative aspects of mutual reciprocal interactions between social, 
knowledge and economic processes in the MFI. Agent problems with: knowledge; social structures; 
behaviour; created fertile conditions for these problematic events. They weakened and eventually destabilised 
economic processes for agents in the MFI by deepening negative interactions between social structure, 
knowledge and actions.   
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Figure 1   Empirical view - Contexts and processes for MFI agents - firms, teams, individuals and markets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theoretical narrative about MFI structure, process and outcomes – in varying conditions  
     The paper develops a ‘theoretical narrative’ to extend understanding of the MFI empirical narrative. 
Authors such as Bourdieu (1990) and Stones (2005) are used as parts of a theoretical frame to explain the 
empirical narrative and to connect a wider range of literature relevant to the empirical findings. They are 
used to interpret the role of knowledge and social forces in the MFI, their complex interactions, and their 
impact on actors such as company top management, analysts and FMs. Lave and Wenger (1991), 
Mackenzie (2006a,b), Meusberger (2009), Henningsson (2009), and Knorr Cetina et al (2002), are used to 
develop theoretical insights into specific MFI elements. All related literature  is used to interpret ongoing 
MFI processes and structures, as well as change processes and major problems. 
Figure 2 provides examples of key literature used to explain the empirical narrative and show how 
specific theory and literature is matched to the empirical constructs illustrated in Figure 1.  
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MFI structures and agents 
     The focus of theory analysis is on a subset of the MFI social network as tripartite links between 
company management, analysts and fund managers. They operated within tailored ‘tiers’, sub networks or 
‘status groups (Preda, 2005). These social networks normally operated within or near geographic territories 
such as the City of London, where the geographic space was a basis to configure and constrain the social 
networks within the centre (Glückler 2013). MFI agents and parent firms had the capability and incentives 
to use technology to extend their networks beyond centres.  Time was an important dimension to the MFI. 
All MFI agents were situated in time-space contexts and social networks. These were the basis for agent 
interactions: face to face; and when physically absent to be connected via technology (Stones, 2005, P28). 
     Bourdieu’s (1990) concepts of ‘fields’: where a field is a network, structure or set of 
relationships; are used to interpret MFI social contexts. Fields were where company managers, analysts, 
fund managers, and other agents acted and reproduced their behaviours, and competed for information 
advantage and power through human, relational and reputational ‘capitals’.  This was especially relevant 
in ‘relationships’, or sub-networks where frequent, high quality exchanges, and disclosures of information 
occur between MFI agents. Stones (2005) also focuses attention on social networks in the MFI. He 
provides means to discuss: elite and operational structures as ‘position practices’; and to note the central 
role of hierarchy and power in the MFI. Stones (2005) concentrates thought on general and specific 
knowledge of MFI insiders. General knowledge was expressed in: culture, ideology and philosophy; as 
power and norms; and as the ‘Intellectual climate’ of the times. Specific knowledge of MFI insiders was 
made up as expert knowledge and finance theory.  
MFI processes and interactions  
Stones (2005)  also provides the basis to analyze interactions of external structure and knowledge 
on MFI agent information activities. He refers to active agency in which agents drew routinely or 
strategically, on their knowledge (internal structure) of external MFI structures to interpret events and 
guide action. These factors combined to frame MFI agent actions and outcomes in their specialist 
information related activities.  The elements of structure, action and outcomes were always present 
together in mutual reciprocal interactions. MFI agents drew on their prior knowledge (general and 
specific) of external MFI structures, and their socialisation and position-practices within these structures, 
to frame their actions within the MFI structures.   They drew on their taken-for-granted (general) 
knowledge of the ‘ghost of networked others’ (Thrift, 1996, p54) in the MFI, and their expert knowledge, 
to inform their actions. Actions and outcomes were not determined by external and internal structure 
alone. Individual agent capabilities and behavioural characteristics modified influences of external 
structures and knowledge on actions and outcomes.  Individual characteristics enabled them to exercise 
some degree of personal choice in these contexts and played a central role in their information activities.    
MFI change and problems 
The theoretical frame above is used above to explore positive mutual reciprocal interactions between 
social structure, knowledge and agent actions, in periods of stability in MFI and finance system.  Section 
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6 argues that Merton’s ‘financial innovation spiral’ (1995) can be connected to Stones’s (2005) 
quadripartite cycle to analyse change processes in the MFI. The extended theoretical frame is used in 
section 7 to explore negative mutual reciprocal interactions between social structure, knowledge and 
actions, during periods of change and failure in MFI and the finance system.  These negative interactions 
weakened economic processes for agents in the MFI and led to failure. The above shows the relevance of 
the combined theoretical sources to the study of accounting and finance phenomena in the MFI. 
Figure 2    Examples of key theoretical and literature sources used in each major part of empirical narrative 
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5. Analysis of empirical insights concerning the MFI – in periods of stability  
 
Section 5 explores MFI structure, processes, agent actions and outcomes, during relatively stable periods 
(1990s) in the world of finance and MFI. The aims are to: expand a combined empirical and theoretical 
narrative; and explore how knowledge, social and behavioural factors play a role; in influencing company 
management, analyst, and FM actions in MFI economic processes.  
 
5.1 External structure for agents - as MFI social networks and parent firm organisation 
 
 The field work demonstrated that the MFI was a market for economic exchanges between many information 
producing and using firms, as well as a market between individual agents and between teams (Barker, 1998).  
It was also a social context (as ‘relations’ and networks) which involved various meetings and interactions 
(expected, actual). These shaped subjectivity of individual agents and teams and ‘disciplined’ their behaviour 
to conform to wider MFI social norms (Roberts et al, 2006). Holland (1995, 2002) revealed how individual 
FMs exploited their power in relationship networks with other FMs and MFI agents to influence and govern 
company management ‘behind the scenes’ on real decisions, and on corporate disclosure behaviour. Company 
management also had a preference for private disclosure to their core FMs and analysts (Holland, 1997, 2005). 
They used public and private disclosure means to influence a core group of ‘relationship’ FMs and analysts in 
the hope they would influence a larger MFI social and economic network (Holland, 2004, 2005) and hence the 
stock market. Roberts et al (2006) noted private meetings between company management and FMs created 
conditions for processes of company executive subjection to FM power.   Holland (1997, 2004, 2005, 2006a,b) 
illustrates how company executives internalised ideas of external social and power structures in the MFI.  
They adapted the company value creation story to match larger MFI stories of value creation (as during the 
‘dot.com’ period, Holland, p74, 2004). They matched their disclosure behaviour and content to needs of 
participants in private MFI networks. 
      The above reveals the network and market structure of the MFI and how its knowledge context, 
information production and use processes provided the larger external organised context in which the 
purposeful agents operated. A key part of the external structure for Stones (2005) concerned  ‘position 
practices’ or webs of interdependencies that an agent was situated in and which mediated external structure 
and agency. Company management specialising in financial communications, analysts, FMs, journalists, PR 
consultants and others were situated in a web of ‘position practices’ in parent firms and MFI. They took 
private action in and ‘performed’ these structures.  Two major ‘position practices’ can be mapped out in the 
MFI field context: at elite levels (1st tier):  and at operational levels (2nd tier).   
     Larger, higher value firms in commerce and finance were socially and economically connected to each 
other in ‘elite social and economic clubs’ or ‘1st tiers’ or ‘status groups’  (Preda, 2005) in the MFI. The largest 
companies were full insiders in the elite world of the MFI, both providing and receiving much private 
information. The ‘elite’ networks were made up of individuals and teams such as the top management and 
Boards involved in directing the largest companies, Investment Banks, Fund Management firms, Rating 
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agencies, Auditors, Financial media and PR consultants (Bellamy Foster, Holleman, 2010). They included 
MFI network ‘gatekeepers’  such as top rated analysts and fund managers in large well resourced financial 
firms. Elite ‘position practices’ also included roles and behaviour of senior members of regulators (eg UK Tri-
partite including Bank of England, FSA, Treasury), and other senior politicians.  They were normally ‘arms 
length’ and with the exception of specialist regulators, adopted a ‘light touch’  up until  2008.  Top 
management and boards acted as transmitters of MFI firm philosophy, culture and objectives (Schein 1989). 
Accounting and finance academics (Whitley, 1986) and MFI based elite agents such as regulators (of financial 
systems) also promoted a shared intellectual climate (Turner, 2009). The MFI also included operational (2nd 
tier) sub-networks. These involved agents in the production and exchange of information, knowledge and 
financial resources, and these were much influenced by elite structures. 
Bourdieu (1990) concept of ‘fields’ where a field is a network, structure or set of relationships, is 
important in this analysis. This idea refers to MFI social contexts where company managers, analysts, 
fund managers, and other agents act and reproduce their behaviours, and compete for information 
advantage and power through human, relational and reputational ‘capitals’.  This is especially the case in 
‘relationships’ or sub-networks where frequent, high quality exchanges, and disclosures of information 
occur between MFI agents. For example, analyst ‘relations’: with companies (Fogarty et al. 2005); with 
fund manager clients (Holland 2006b); and with other information producers and users; were subsets of 
larger networks and formed a core part of the MFI field.  As Healy and Palepu (2003, p. 21) comment 
“Sell side analysts do not make their projections in isolation, but in a network of ongoing 
relationships”. Fogarty and Rogers (2005) argued that the social and institutional context surrounding 
financial analysts affected how they made their recommendations. These social contexts created 
supportive conditions for the exchange of both ‘soft’ information and ‘hard’ information within the 
analyst parent firm such as a bank (Stein, 2001) or mutual fund (Chen et al, 2004) and between MFI 
actors. Success in information transactions in turn enhanced trust and reproduction of networked 
relations. 
5.2 Resources of Power and Knowledge, 
         Power is an essential resource when discussing MFI external structures. Bourdieu’s ideas (1990) 
suggest that power in MFI firms and their agents is likely to arise from: their size and control over 
resources. These include: knowledge; information; financial capital; track record and reputation; 
‘relations’; and specialist information related skills. Combinations of resources (individual and parent 
firm) determine relative bargaining power of MFI agents over: supply and exchange of information and 
knowledge; their use of information and knowledge; and ability to impose sanctions.  Variation in these 
factors led to a hierarchy of power in the MFI whereby MFI elites had power over operational agents, and 
both had power over small investors.   In Stones (2005) terms, elites in the MFI used their connected 
position-practices, superior resources and power to resist the external social structures and forces they 
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faced. They played an active role in constructing external structures for operational MFI agents in their 
local networks.  
      Power varied across MFI agents. Elites as board members and executives (or ‘dominant coalitions’, 
Cyert and March, 1963), exploited knowledge in and exercised hierarchical power over operational agents 
in firms and MFI networks.  Company top management had ‘information supply’ power and ‘business 
model and earnings knowledge’ power over analysts. Their power was supplemented by PR and media 
consultants. Company management had advertising expenditure power over financial media. If they were 
banks they had financing power supply over financial media firms (HSBC case March 2015). Fund 
managers and their analysts had economic power over which sell side analysts to use. Fund managers had 
‘governance’ and ‘ownership’ power over companies when demanding information. Sell side analysts 
had: ‘technical’ power arising from specialised knowledge of companies in sectors; and ‘parent’ power 
arising from the prestige of their parent investment bank.   
      The relative bargaining power of operational MFI agents in economic and social networks was based 
on agent knowledge and information: of economic processes; social networks; and power asymmetries. 
This played a role in private and public exchange of information. Active agency in information 
production depended on agent understanding of power and positions of connected MFI agents. For 
example, if company management and FMs were discussing a special financial variables and KPIs for 
intangible value drivers, sell side analysts knew they would be expected to show special expertise in these 
areas. Small investors were outsiders to this private MFI social system and had no bargaining power 
unless they could mobilise regulators or politicians. UK price sensitive information legislation in 1993-94 
(Holland, 1996) and US ‘Fair disclosure’ (SEC, 2000) are examples of regulation boosting public 
disclosure and reducing private disclosure (Holland, 2005). 
       Knowledge was also a critical resource when discussing MFI structures and agent actions. Field studies 
also showed that the MFI was a ‘community of practice’ (Lave and Wenger 1991) and a ‘market for 
knowledge’ (Meusberger, 2009) whereby knowledge of companies, of economies, of markets and of market 
agents, was created, used, exchanged and shared. Knowledge creation and capabilities were at the heart of 
information production, analysis and reporting/disclosure in the MFI and security markets (Holland et al, 
2012). MFI agent knowledge was dominated by expert knowledge (Holland, 2006; Abhayawansa et al (2015); 
Holland, 2016).This included understanding interactions of intangibles and tangibles in company business 
models and earnings generation.  It also included agent understanding of their own intermediation models 
(information, financial). Over time expert knowledge was formed in MFI agents and diffused in MFI social 
and economic contexts. Some finance theory was used but this was a low priority relative to own expert 
knowledge.  For example finance theory use in fund management was limited because of problems of 
usefulness (Coleman, 2014, 2015; Holland, 2014).   
The above indicates suggest that individual MFI operational agents (such as analysts and fund 
managers) internalised practical ways of working based on their previous learning experiences in the MFI 
field. They internalised their understanding of external structures and acted within their ‘habitus’ of 
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socialised norms or tendencies (Bordieu, 1977, 1990). Habitus refers to states of readiness (dispositions), 
habits, ways of doing, thinking and perceiving the world that MFI agents acquired as individuals or teams 
as they experience their working lives in the MFI. The existence of agent ‘habitus’ in ‘communities of 
practice’ meant MFI agents were predisposed to structure relationships, networks, and states of trust and 
confidence. This in turn created enabling conditions for; financial communications;  other information 
flows; decisions; learning and knowledge creation; between MFI agents.    
Stones (2005) argued that agent’s knowledge of external structures included both general and 
specific knowledge. General knowledge for MFI agents included knowledge and world views about the 
MFI world, its social structures and culture, and the roles of agents within it. It incorporated relatively 
unquestioned, taken for granted ideas about the nature and role of financial capitalism, of money, wealth, 
position and power in the world economy. It involved normative commitments to the idea that ‘efficient’ 
financial markets and financial institutions were the best way to allocate risk capital. General knowledge 
included broad acceptance of: key financial information technologies such as the internet, data bases, and 
accounting; market exchange mechanisms; financial institutions; financial centres; and their joint roles in 
the narrative of finance capitalism. It included patterns of behaviour and habits of speech expected in the 
City of London and in virtual locations such equity trading market mechanisms. It included: shared 
understandings about a culture of secrecy and privacy in the MFI (Holland, 2002); a tendency to think 
primarily within this finance social ‘bubble’; and sense of entitlement to high pay (Jones, 2014).  This 
general understanding was communicated by top management to ‘operational’ agents as ‘philosophy’, 
culture and ideology. It was transferred to operational agents through: ‘learning on the job’; training;   and 
absorption of MFI and firm culture (Holland et al, 2012).  This changed operational agent’s ‘habitus’ 
(Bourdieu, 1990) in line with firm culture and wider MFI social norms. 
Knowledge also included specific knowledge as established finance theory and expert knowledge.  
Established finance theory was developed by academics and acquired by agents during education. 
General knowledge and finance theory overlapped and shaped each other in the social ‘bubble’ of 
‘finance and investment society’. Finance theory was used as a conceptual means to explain and justify 
financial markets and financial firms and had a major influence on behaviours. This has been interpreted 
as performativity by MacKenzie and Millo, (2003) and MacKenzie, (2006a,b). Before the GFC, general 
knowledge (Stones, 2005) and finance theory: created agents predispositions toward their MFI world; and 
contributed to and shaped the intellectual climate; shared between finance practitioners, academics and 
politicians (Whitely 1986; Holland, 2010; King, 2014). Specific knowledge also included expert 
knowledge developed by MFI agents over time. This corresponded to ideas of ‘intellectual capital’ 
(Meritum, 2002) including knowledge of: social and economic networks; company business models in 
real markets (IIRC, 2011); financial markets; and of their relationship to numbers.  It included knowledge 
of calculative devices and numbers (Vollmer et al 2009) such as company accounting, cash flow, 
valuation (by agents and markets), and risk.  MFI agents also had to understand: the rules and games 
played in social networks (Stones, 2005); how other external MFI agents understood the world of finance; 
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what their expectations of behaviour were; what power they had; and what sanctions existed. They had to 
understand how understandings and actions of others in the MFI affected stock prices and how they could 
exploit this.  Specific knowledge was central to agents’ trust and confidence in others, their ultimate 
decisions and the agent power to act in networks.  In practice both general and specific knowledge 
functioned together as ‘knowledge for guiding action’. They were not separable and the line between 
them could also change with learning in their professional ‘community of practice’ (Lave and Wenger 
1991) in the MFI.  
5.3. Active agency and actions in context  
    The field studies showed how MFI agents produced their own specialised judgements (information 
disclosed, valuation, buy/sell recommendation, audit opinion, rating etc) about companies and related 
economic events and market changes, and added their own MFI based reputation to their judgements to 
provide assurance to other agents. Power’s (2009) comment about financial auditing (and hence other agents) 
operating as ‘part of a wider network of mutual assurance and co-dependency’, indicates that the MFI was a 
key part of a ‘web of assurance that contributed to financial stability’. 
      The field studies also revealed how MFI agents adopted similar decision logics and behavioural norms in 
their common settings (Holland 2005, 2006a,b; Holland et al 2014). Agents such as company management or 
analysts publicly disclosed information structured according to reporting and stock exchange requirements. 
Agent private disclosure was based on MFI norms based on shared views of corporate value creation 
structures and narrative structure (Holland, 2009). This was critical in making ‘soft’ information about 
“invisible” intangibles in company value creation visible to other MFI actors (Abhayawansa et al, 2015). 
These subjective sources of information were used in numeric estimation, valuation, and decisions.  However, 
the subjective information created common behavioural problems of bias and optimism for agents such as 
analysts and company managers (Fogarty and Rogers (2005).    
    Actions by MFI agents were also influenced by their own and parent firm states in ‘finance and investment 
society’ such as reputation, and by perceived social legitimacy of MFI agents.   Thus combined knowledge 
and social factors influenced agent economic activity in a complex set of dynamic and reciprocal interactions.   
The resulting economic actions and processes by agents in the MFI and stock markets involved production and 
exchange of information for valuation reasons by companies, analysts, journalists, FMs and other MFI agents 
(Barker, 1998). These in turn affected security market prices (Holland, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2009).     
        Field studies show how external social factors and MFI agent knowledge of this world (Stones, 2005) 
provided the relatively stable organising order central to action. Holland and Johanson (p482, 2003) noted;  
‘..companies, analysts,..FMs make common (unquestioned) use of larger market accepted constructs and a common financial 
language. Confidence in these constructs is buttressed by ….trust and continuing exchanges in a trio of information market 
relationships involving company-FM relations, company–sell side analysts relations, and FM-analyst relations’ 
 
Stable MFI contexts or priors such as: established knowledge; durable reputations in networks; and 
long-standing company value creation narratives created opportunities for speedy, high quality 
information exchanges and ritualised behaviours to take place between MFI agents such as company 
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management, analysts and fund managers (Holland, 2002, 2003, 2005, Holland and Johanson, 2003). 
They created conditions of trust and confidence for: exchange of subjective impressionistic information; 
and for creating confidence in the exchange of estimates of numerical information. In contrast to formal 
reporting they allowed impressionistic and subjective (‘soft’) information to be created and exchanged 
(Holland et al 2012), and for private information (in excess of public information) to be exchanged by 
MFI agents (Holland, 2005).  Complexity of information about company intangibles was a problem for 
MFI agents. Henningsson et al (2015) noted that FMs tended to trust the stable context of company 
information and strove to trust top management. Nevertheless, FMs oscillated between exhibiting trust 
and distrust when reducing the complexity of information on intangible resources and sustainability. 
An important part of the ‘soft’ information set was the narrative about company value creation. 
MFI agents such as company executive, analysts and journalists all had their own version of this 
narrative. Maise (2014) showed how the combination of company disclosures, analyst reports, and 
journalist ‘news’ and stories all contributed to a social consensus about the company ‘story’  in the MFI 
and financial markets. Each MFI agent sought to influence and frame the dominant narrative and 
consensus sense making in MFI social structures and stock market. However such ‘stability’ could 
conceal mythmaking (Holland, 2005). 
5.4. Outcomes 
There were a range of economic and social outcomes of agent activity in MFI social, knowledge and 
economic contexts. For example, MFI agent disclosure of new company information (‘news’, advice 
provided, forecasts, valuations, ratings, assurance provided) and subsequent actions created expectations 
about companies for economic actors, and influenced and changed the behaviour of actors (eg FM 
actions). Holland (2004, 2006) notes how the information activities of MFI agents within the MFI 
network altered information, knowledge, and social states in individual agents, parent firms, and MFI. 
These in turn played a role in changes in price, volume, volatility, and liquidity in the stock market.  
Economic outcomes in the MFI also included economic benefits for agents. Company management 
sought positive reactions from shareholders, desirable stock price outcomes, and executive bonuses 
related to stock price performance.  FMs sought: value relevant information, investment opportunities, 
and improved performance relative to portfolio benchmarks; and fees and bonuses for managing funds. 
Analysts sought value relevant information, new research business opportunities, trading commissions for 
parent research firms, and bonuses for analysts. At the wider market level MFI market mechanisms and 
networks were means to exchange information, knowledge, and confidence between many market 
participants and for this to form into equivalent aggregate market and social network states. MFI states 
included states of established knowledge, consensus and reputation concerning companies and agents 
(Holland, 2004, 2005, 2006). These contributed to wider market states in the MFI (information set, 
confidence etc) and stock market (prices, volatility, liquidity and volume trades).  As a result, individually 
and collectively, many connected MFI agents, on an ongoing basis, created information and assurance, 
and supported accountability.  
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6. Change in the MFI    
Section 4 discusses how change occurs in the MFI, both positive and negative, and how it can be 
understood and potentially influenced. Change makes visible interactions between MFI social structure, 
knowledge, actions and outcomes; as well as how major problems emerged. Three connected examples of 
MFI change for sell side analysts are outlined. 
    The first example notes how analyst reputation was created by learning by many MFI actors: during 
many information exchanges between them and analysts; and analyst success and failure.  Analyst’s 
individual qualities, capabilities, knowledge, and track record, were over time, recognised by other MFI 
participants as reputation (Holland, 2005, Holland et al 2012) or prestigious cultural capital (Bordieu, 
1990).  Improved analyst’s reputation enhanced relations with companies and FMs and reduced barriers 
to information exchanges (Holland, 2005, 2006).  Before the GFC this led to relatively stable ranking 
structures for analysts across the MFI, whereby individual analyst position changed but not the social 
structure. Hence there were strong economic incentives to invest in reputation and relations (Fogarty et al. 
2005) in MFI networks (Holland, 2005, 2006). The second example notes how changes in technology 
changed MFI social structures.  This occurred when previously ‘face to face’ interactions and information 
services, were replaced by technology. As some information services became commodified and 
automated by firms such as Bloombergs and Thomson Financial (Haig, 2014), sell side analysts made 
their information products more research intensive to secure close relations with company management 
and FMs.  A third example post GFC, concerns new ‘boutique’ sell side analysts (Haig, 2014) providing 
knowledge intensive insights into company business models. They emerged due to technology change 
and failure of sell side analysts during ‘dot.com’, Enron and GFC events. These eroded sell side analysts 
competitive advantages based on ‘relations’ with companies and fund managers. Competition in the form 
of automated ‘analyst’ reports, ‘forensic’ financial reporting services, and ‘boutique’ analysts (Haig, 
2014) has shaken up their world.  New competitors exploited their unique capabilities, network links, 
economic change processes, and problems to create changes in MFI structures.   
         The change examples indicate that longer term economic change processes in the MFI involved an 
information variant of Merton’s ‘financial innovation spiral’ (1995) whereby : the forms of information 
intermediation; their information products; information users and their needs; and the wider market for 
information; evolved together over time. Broader changes included: growth of knowledge based 
intangibles in company business models; technology change; globalisation; ‘securitisation’; and 
‘financialisation’ Epstein (2001). These have led to change in: corporate financial communication; 
analyst’s roles; and FM investing behaviour. Ongoing improvements in information and communication 
technology and a decline in transactions costs for information exchanges have intensified competition as 
information intermediaries sought to satisfy users information needs. The history of innovative financial 
information products indicate a pattern whereby information products initially offered privately by 
information intermediaries, become standardised, automated, commodified (eg analysis of company 
financial statements by analysts) and were disclosed publicly. This created new incentives for information 
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intermediaries to innovate with new technology, new products and other agents to satisfy changing user 
information needs and to maintain social connections. 
In terms of knowledge change, sell side analyst cases indicated that ongoing interactions and 
exchanges (social and economic) in the MFI led to construction of agent expert knowledge or intellectual 
capital (Holland, et al 2012).  This was new specific knowledge (Stones, 2005) about decisions and 
situations for agents which changed the internal (knowledge) structures (Stones, 2005) of many MFI 
agents in their communities of practice (Lave and Wenger, 1991).  These knowledge change processes 
were possible because MFI agents normally operated within concentrated social networks in geographic 
territories such as the City of London (Glückler, 2013).   
     In terms of social change the examples indicate that social structures in the MFI were changed by 
agent knowledge changes and by technology changes especially in communities of practice (Lave and 
Wenger, 1991). MFI social structure, as social networks and MFI agent reputations, was influenced over 
time by these historical change factors (Stones, 2005). The examples of change show how MFI agents 
(such as analysts) and their parent firms (such as investment banks), have in Bordieu’s (1990) terms, 
changed their ‘habitus’, field or domain, cultural capital and tacit knowledge, in the MFI social structure.   
       The analysis above reveals that a MFI ‘change spiral’ existed and involved mutual and reciprocal 
interactions between economic, knowledge and social change processes.    This suggests that Merton’s 
financial innovation spiral (1995) can be linked to Stones’s (2005) structuration views. Both are iterative, 
reflective processes driven by purposeful agent actions in a combined economic, social and knowledge 
context.  Each has a varying focus on elements of intimately connected economic, social and knowledge 
processes in the same empirical phenomena. Such developments in MFI theoretical understanding are 
required for critical analysis of MFI functioning, change, successes and failures.   
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7. Empirical insights into problems in the MFI       
     Section 7 discusses how MFI problems formed an important part of the MFI empirical narrative. The 
history of problems in the MFI made visible: social and economic networks; and interactions between 
structure, knowledge, and actions.  They revealed how negative interactions can arise and contribute to 
MFI failures.  Problems are divided into ongoing behavioral problems and major problems.  
Ongoing behavioural problems in the MFI 
Ongoing problems involved ‘games’ playing by agents such as company management in ‘earnings 
management smoothing’ and business model ‘story management’. These created a base of accepted 
norms from which more serious problems have emerged. Earnings management by company management 
is ‘normal’ behaviour in the MFI and can be seen as a long standing problem. Graham et al’s (2005) field 
research revealed that US company management used real economic change to manage their reported 
earnings figures. They had a strong preference for a smooth earnings path, leading to lower perceptions of 
firm risk. Walker (2013, p451) argued that this showed that ‘academic researchers needed to take much 
more seriously the possibility that firms may be regularly making value-destroying real economic choices 
in order to meet earnings benchmarks’. This paper argues that company management had strong MFI 
based incentives to manage all major information sources about company value creation. Company 
management understood that analysts and fund managers sought information on how changes in 
intangibles and tangibles in the company business model were connected to expected incremental changes 
in cash flow statements, and to profit and loss and balance sheet items. Value relevant information was 
expected to arise from the analysis of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ information sources. Holland (2005, 2009) 
reported how company management sought to control the narrative about the company business model. 
This ‘story management’ was combined with ‘income smoothing’ as a  joint means to lower perceptions 
of firm risk in the MFI. On occasion, ‘successful’ managers constructed untested value creation myths 
about companies (Howcroft, 2001; Holland, 2005) with this leading to serious problems.   
This reveals the wider ‘information game’ that MFI agents such as management were involved in 
with analysts and FMs (Holland, 2005, 2006). The ‘rules of the game’ were well understood by MFI 
agents and formed part of their ‘habitus’ (Bordieu, 1990). Agent ‘habitus’ influenced  their cognitive 
states by focussing on the familiar,  by reducing choices in information disclosure and search, and by 
encouraging ‘acceptable’ information gaming by agents.  Walker (2013) argued more ‘Research on how 
the earnings game is played’ is required. This paper argues that more research is required on, the broader 
information ‘game’, and how the social, knowledge and economic setting in the MFI, allowed this ‘game’ 
to go on unchecked and for major problems to emerge. 
Major problems and failure in the MFI before the GFC  
     On occasion, the wider ‘information game’ between MFI agents such as management, analysts and 
FMs, has gone badly wrong leading to major failures in the supply and demand of information. Problems 
with knowledge and social factors, combined with ‘gaming’ behaviour, and played a role in weakening, 
impeding and eventually destabilising economic processes in the MFI, agents and parent firms. Many 
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extreme examples of bias and manipulation of company reports and ‘intangibles’ disclosure arose during:  
“dot.com” problems of 1997-2000 (Howcroft, 2001; Holland 2002, 2003; Holland and Johanson, 2003; 
Palepu et al 2008);    Enron in 2002 (Healy et al 2003); Northern Rock in 2007 (Fallon, 2015); and 2008-
2009 GFC (Turner, 2009; Levin-Coburn report 2011; Holland 2010).  
        The problems arose, in part, from changing conditions in MFI firms before the GFC. Stein (2002), 
Chen et al (2004), and Holland et al (2014) illustrated the problems of organisational structure and control 
in MFI firms such as fund managers, rating agencies and investment banks, especially the largest and 
most complex organisations. They revealed problems with: internal risk taking culture, strategy, 
incentives, and control mechanisms  before 2007; including slow learning by top management and front 
line, relative to faster MFI change (Revans, 1998); leading to out-of-date and inappropriate business 
models of MFI firms. These contributed to operational agents distorting information and assurance 
produced in MFI. 
       The problems also arose from existing social and knowledge conditions in the MFI and changes in 
corporate economic transformation processes. The private nature of the MFI  elite and operational 
structures and their high use of ‘soft’ and subjectively based information  made small investors in the MFI 
vulnerable to the construction of biased, faulty and deceitful public narratives about company value 
creation processes as sources of value.  The growth of the ‘knowledge economy’ also increased corporate 
control and power over information production about company business models (Holland, 2005, 2009).   
        Howcroft (2001) discussed how mythology was an ‘important vehicle for establishing a number of 
dubious justifications for participating in the dot.com share market’. This was not a paradigm shift but 
‘reflects a speculative bubble, one that has been created by numerous investment analysts and bankers 
who are keen to build upon rampant speculation about high-technology stocks’. Valliere et al (2004) 
argued that venture capital investors developed ‘groupthink’ in a ‘psychic prison’ (Morgan, 1986) during 
‘dot.com’ period.  The ‘psychic prison’ arose in inward looking and closed social networks (in firms and 
the MFI) which constrained modes of thinking and trapped investors in webs and myths of their own or 
others creation. This ‘contributed to the bypassing of generally accepted practices by investors who 
believed they were behaving rationally’ when investing in much hyped ‘dot.com’ business models. The 
Enron case (Healy et al 2003) revealed the opportunities for corporate hubris and for exercise of extreme 
opportunism, bias and deceit, via subjectively based disclosure vehicles such as narrative.  It illustrated 
failures of analysts, fund managers, auditors and financial media to question this behaviour. Issues of 
inadequate ‘expert’ knowledge by MFI agents of new company business models, was a critical factor in 
their failure.  
Failures in the MFI during the GFC  
A spectacular example of failure arose before the banking crisis of 2007-2009 when MFI agents 
failed to understand new bank business models (Holland, 2010). During 2000 to 2006, bank sell side 
analysts, fund managers and financial media, found it difficult to explore bank business models with 
management (Chen et al 2014). Despite this lack of understanding FMs and bank analysts demanded ever 
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higher returns from banks and widespread adoption of riskier business models. High exposure to financial 
risk had been accepted by MFI agents, and by regulators and financial markets within a shared intellectual 
climate based on established knowledge (Turner, 2009; King, 2014). Bank top management were not 
prepared (or able) to discuss radical changes in their business models. Fund managers and their buy side 
analysts showed little interest in the issues (Holland, 2010, Chen et al 2014) as they exploited rapidly 
growing earnings and security prices for banks. Northern Rock’s failure in September 2007, Lehman’s 
failure in September 2008 and the subsequent GFC, reflected these problems. The combination of low 
awareness of issues, and high economic incentives was similar to behaviour in the MFI in ‘dot.com’ 
boom (Palepu et al 2008; Holland, 2002) and the Enron case (Healy and Palepu, 2003).  
 These problems were in part, attributable to: concentrations of elite power and influence in private 
social networks in the MFI; and to economic incentives in the world of finance and MFI.  In the periods 
just before the: ‘dot.com boom; Enron; Northern Rock failure; and the great financial crisis (GFC); both 
elite and operational MFI agents gave the impression of acting on well understood and tested knowledge 
about: company business models and real markets; MFI social structures; financial markets; and MFI 
firms.  This constituted a form of collective ‘impression management’ (Abhayawansa et al, 2015).  Elite 
MFI agents, operating in large banks, other large financial firms, regulators, and ‘quality’ media  used 
‘established knowledge’ (expert knowledge and theory of finance) in a conservative and dogmatic fashion 
in controlled social structures (networks, firms) to create a false impression of ‘correct’ knowledge use 
(Turner, 2009; King, 2014).  This was an effective way for elite insiders to influence collective levels of 
trust, confidence and meaning structures amongst the public, other investors, and politicians. However, 
they created risk exposures that could not be ‘managed’ through principles based on expert knowledge, 
where much of upside benefits would accrue to them and where downside losses would be experienced 
by others. The latter included: quasi insiders such as Northern Rock; and outsiders including the investing 
and saving public.  
Regulatory failure in the MFI during the GFC  
        The above illustrates how negative social and knowledge factors, and  ‘gaming’ behaviour, played a 
role in weakening, impeding and eventually destabilising economic processes for MFI, agents and parent 
firms.  The same class of problems arose across these market events (Dot.com, Enron, Northern Rock, 
GFC) and revealed the connected and systematic nature of problems faced by many specialist MFI firms. 
However the Northern Rock failure (in September 2007) and the support given to large banks during the 
GFC (September 2008 onwards) reveal how social and knowledge factors contributed to differences in 
the way these processes occur during crises. Northern Rock as a small 3rd tier bank (quasi insider) had 
few advantages in terms of social position, power, and knowledge in the MFI and associated banking 
markets, compared to large, insider, and influential 1st tier banks. Northern Rock was not ’too big to fail’ 
and its top management and board were not full insiders or members of the elite. A combination of: 
capital flight to 1st tier banks in interbank deposit market; lukewarm Bank of England and government 
support; major declines in trust and confidence in MFI agents and outsiders; created conditions for 
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problems in smaller banks.  In the Northern Rock case this combined with major public questions and 
debate about the bank’s heavy reliance on inter-bank funding. The market factors and bank factors, 
combined in precipitating the Northern Rock bank run (Fallon 2015). In contrast, 1st tier banks such as 
HBOS and RBS secured government and regulator support in 2008.  It appeared  that issues of: systemic 
risk and elite influence; from and about 1st tier banks viewed as ‘too big to fail’; secured full government 
and regulator financial resources, support, and bank survival. Questions of position, power, and access to 
information and funds, differed between insider and quasi insider cases. In both large and smaller banks 
cases many factors were similar but did not produce the same responses in regulators and the MFI.  
MFI agent and regulator knowledge problems with: business models, finance theory (as ideology), 
interpreting behaviour of others (regulators, politicians, other banks etc); and social problems of 
collective trust and confidence; were similar. These impeded the role of analysts, media, rating agencies, 
regulators, politicians in similar ways, but social structure and power issues mediated their effects.  
     The crisis in specialist banking and finance sectors also provided insights into stability of structure and 
function of the MFI. It showed how a special group of elite agents took control of MFI functions and 
banking markets. Elite agents from regulation and government became dominant in MFI and banking 
markets during bank and financial crises. When banks and banking markets failed, and when parts of MFI 
dealing with large banks failed, these elite agents became especially important to markets for: information 
creation and use; secrecy; provision of funds; and exercise of power. Government power and financial 
resources became central: as top management power in large banks waned; but banks becoming very 
significant due to their ‘too big to fail status’.  Secrecy was enforced by powerful agents as they sought 
‘behind scenes’ solutions to bank problems.  They formally disclosed and informally leaked information 
about solutions, to MFI, banking markets, media and public. They did this on a selective basis to frame 
external interpretations, avoid panics and to ‘jolt’ markets and banks back into life. The UK government 
plan was to ‘reassure markets with a decisive, clear and completed intervention in one stroke’ (p298, 
Fallon, 2015) by boosting bank capital in all major UK banks. ‘Spin doctors’ from politics also entered 
the process and pursued political as much as economic aims. They ‘leaked’ to the media, creating 
momentum to stories and forcing bankers to accept government plans. The MFI was not fully moribund. 
Some elite parts of the media especially Robert Peston  (from BBC) penetrated this ‘wall of secrecy’ 
through connections with regulators, treasury officials, politicians and ‘spin doctors’ at cabinet level.  
     The above history of major problems and failures in the MFI has made visible many social and 
economic networks involving elite and operational agents. They have provided new data on mutual, 
reciprocal interactions between structure, knowledge, economic and social actions, and outcomes in the 
MFI and how negative interactions can occur in each of these elements. This has provided empirical 
support for empirical and theoretical narratives discussed in sections 5 and 6 and created opportunities for 
theoretical analysis of problems in section 8.  
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8. Theoretical analysis of major problems and failures     
    Section 8 uses the theoretical narrative developed in sections 5 and 6 to analyse MFI problems and 
failures outlined in section 7. The use of theoretical sources to interpret empirical insights demonstrates 
the importance of developing a new theory framework to stimulate the debate and open up the private 
world of the MFI. Theoretical sources are used to develop the analysis of four critical factors in MFI 
external structure identified previously concerning: elite agents; a culture of secrecy; concentration of 
resources; and control over the latter by elites. Theoretical sources are also used to further explore how 
structural problems factors exacerbated existing knowledge problems for agents. Problems arose with 
specific knowledge (Stones, 2005); with the promotion of ‘pure’ finance theory; the ignoring of economic 
history; and complacency in expert knowledge and learning (Holland, 2010). Problems also arose with 
the public narrative on how the finance system and its MFI component worked and provided benefits.  
The analysis highlights how problematic conditions in MFI external social structures and agent 
knowledge: as well as ongoing behavioural problems; created fertile conditions for problematic events 
such as, the ‘dot.com’ boom, Enron case,  Northern Rock failure, and GFC; leading to adverse outcomes 
for less informed and less powerful investors. 
8.1 Problems of external structure – elites, secrecy, concentration, power 
    Several authors have identified elites as a critical factor in MFI social networks or external structure. 
Scott (1993) refers to this environment of elite financial relations between the fund managers, bankers 
and executives in the UK (large) corporate sector as a “constellation of interests” in UK finance capital’.  
Financial elites have grown since the 1990s (Beaverstock et al,2013; Hutton, 2015).  The shift in elite 
ownership of financial assets also reflects sharp increases in the share of income of the top 0.1 and 1.0 % 
in the US and UK relative to Germany and France over the period since 1970 (Atkinson and Morelli, 
(2014). Kay (2015. P54) attributes this to the ‘financialisation’ process, the dominant role of the US and 
UK financial markets and large banks in this process, and to increasing incomes in the finance sector. 
This led to concentration of power and resources in key clusters in financial system (Economist, 
August 18th 2012; FT Jan 15th 2015) and in MFI networks. Large banks had the capacity to exert high 
control over wholesale banking markets and MFI through ‘relations’ and ‘tiers’ or ‘status groups’ (Preda, 
2005). Large investment banks incorporated MFI functions such as analyst’s research functions and fund 
management functions, and they transacted in securities which relied on the MFI. High concentration also 
existed for the largest auditing firms, rating agencies, financial media firms and asset management firms 
(Haldane, 2014).  These MFI firms and their agents transacted with each other, they operated in the same 
world financial centres and close social contacts occurred between their top management elites and 
between them and regulators.  
      A major external structure issue was that MFI structures, knowledge and behaviour were invisible to 
many ‘outsiders’. Elite and operational agents in MFI shared a strong culture of secrecy and privacy for 
information and knowledge. Secrecy was a primary source of power advantages and wealth creation. This 
reflected norms of the world of finance which Kay (2015) argued has grown separate from ordinary 
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people to become an industry that talks to itself while handling their capital. Elite and operational agents 
constructed private networks that were invisible to small investors and excluded public discussion of 
social power, and knowledge advantages of MFI elites. These conditions excluded the wider public from 
benefits of private information and exchange, and ignored how they experienced disadvantages. 
      Elite agents also constructed the public narrative for operational agents and outsiders concerning 
benefits of the system.  Elite agents used their social network positions, roles and power relative to 
operational agents and the wider public to promote arguments from ‘general knowledge’ of finance 
capitalism and from finance theory and used these to justify these conditions (Stones, 2005). MFI insiders 
argued that outsiders gained benefits of: high quality public information; ‘free rider’ or ‘trickle down’ 
benefits of efficient markets; rational risky asset pricing; and professional MFI agents.  They argued that 
MFI agents disclosed much privately produced information through intermediaries such as the media. 
However, media agents faced major conflicts of interest in their roles arising from:  important social and 
economic connections to insiders. This could bias their independent reporting role for the public. 
Elites, resources and exercise of power 
 The presence of elites and their power over MFI were not necessarily problems if there was high 
transparency of elite actions and effective accountability. Concentrations of size and power were not seen 
as a problem by elite agents if they involved ‘quality’ and size ‘tiers’ between the largest financial and 
information firms, and where there was plenty of competition and choice within the ‘tier’ (Lewis and 
Davies 1987). Elite agents used finance theory: to argue that size and elite tiers were efficient means to 
deal with problems of; information asymmetry, adverse selection and moral hazard; through sophisticated 
buyer and seller interactions in wholesale markets (caveat emptor) for financial transactions and 
information (Lewis and Davies 1987). They were a problem, if small, private, elites from large firms (in 
restricted networks) controlled ideas and manipulated ideas and information for their own benefit. This 
created a mythical public narrative and a ‘psychic prison’ (Morgan, 1986) for smaller firms and 
individuals. The ‘dot.com’ episode, Enron, and GFC provide evidence that elites in finance used social 
networks, knowledge, knowledge creation and use for their own personal and elite group benefit (Sikka, 
2009). Close contact of elites with regulators created conditions for conglomerate financial firms to 
successfully lobby (in private) for ‘light touch’ regulation in banking and financial markets, and the MFI, 
before the GFC. During the ‘dot.com’ boom 1997-2000 (Holland, 2002), the Enron case (Healy and 
Palepu, 2003), and the GFC (Holland, 2010), elite and operational MFI agents exploited their social 
positions, roles and power in MFI networks to control and influence information relative to ‘outsiders’. 
This included information arising from: companies issuing securities; analyst research; rating agencies; 
financial media; and information provided to FMs. The quality of information from the supply side was 
distorted as it flowed to the demand side, leading to failures in conventional governance and 
accountability systems.  In Stones (2005) terms those with more resources could dictate social structure, a 
culture of secrecy, behaviour, and economic terms to others. Paraphrasing Sikka (2009) there is nothing 
neutral about MFI structures, processes and outcomes. MFI elements are the residue of negotiations and 
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bargaining amongst economic elites and reflect their economic interests. Those who finance and control 
the policymaking structures are always in a position to shape the outcomes for their benefit. 
8.2   Knowledge problems 
      Stones (2005) concepts of general and specific knowledge provide a conceptual means to explore how 
different dimensions to knowledge can play differing roles in major problems in the world of finance and 
the MFI.  In the pre GFC period from 2000 to 2007 general knowledge and finance theory were used as a 
dominant public means of explanation of the MFI function and of the banking and finance system 
(Turner, 2009). This involved a ‘silent unsaid agreement’ amongst MFI elite agents and operational 
agents against the interests of the wider investing public.  Elite MFI agents such as top management 
transmitted general knowledge of finance and finance theory ideas to operational agents via the MFI 
firm’s hierarchy and MFI networks. This was manifest as the shared ‘intellectual climate’ (Turner, 2009; 
King, 2014; Carney, 2015) or general (often unconscious) knowledge  (Stones, 2005) of MFI agents. It 
was promoted by powerful networked agents in finance-investment society such as senior management in 
large investment banks and ‘their’ submissive credit rating agencies. They included ‘information 
regulators’ such as accounting and auditing bodies, stock exchange and security market regulars, and 
bank and financial institution regulators. The regulators were effectively silenced and disempowered by 
their acceptance of the shared intellectual climate.  
      The role of the MFI elite in defining ‘established knowledge’ and the ‘shared intellectual climate ‘ in 
finance meant that they also framed the way operational MFI staff viewed ‘information’ and hence the  
content of information exchanged in the MFI.  A similar process was at work in promoting ideas of new 
business models before the ‘dot.com’ boom, the Enron case, and the GFC. Given that this ‘knowledge’ 
was flawed before the events, then so was the information. These factors played a role in distorting MFI 
operational agent’s internal structure or expert knowledge and created a wider ‘psychic’ prison (Morgan, 
1986). They created social blindness (Henningsson, 2009) and overconfidence with respect to specific 
knowledge (as finance theory and expert knowledge). They elevated conventional finance theory to the 
level of an ideology when seeking to ‘explain’ how MFI and associated financial markets worked 
(Turner, 2009; King, 2014, Carney, 2015). 
          In addition, MFI agents did not invest in learning  to ensure that  expert knowledge reflected the 
rapid rate of change and new character of financial institutions, markets and associated information 
services. Operational network agents were not incentivised by top management in MFI firms to test 
conventional theory ideas or to develop new expert knowledge based on the new circumstances. They 
believed (or did not question) theoretical ideas as the idealised explanation for their roles and they ignored 
problems with ‘out-of-date’ expert knowledge (Turner, 2009; Carney, 2015).  This reflected their wealth 
incentives or as Sinclair (1994) noted: "It is difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends on his 
not understanding it".   
      Galbraith (1954, p28) argued that knowledge of the great crash of 1929 was the best safeguard against 
its recurrence. Prior knowledge of economic history could have sensitised MFI agents and regulators to 
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the idea that some low probability events in banking and financial markets occur with catastrophic 
financial consequences.  This knowledge would have questioned the development of new types of bank 
models, financial products and markets (Holland, 2010) and reduced the chances of bank failure during 
the GFC of 2007-09.  However, the use of such knowledge was not in the economic interests of elites in 
the financial system as it distracted attention from growth and wealth maximising aims for their financial 
firms.  From their perspective it made more sense to promote the ‘good news’ of established finance 
theory as efficient markets, informed asset pricing, and the risk diversification on bank balance sheets and 
wholesale financial markets.   Lord King noted (2014) 'I think the real problem was there was a shared intellectual 
view that things were going well.' 
8.3 Combinations of exposures and vulnerability to sudden change 
     The combination of factors such as: elite pressures; economic incentives; knowledge as ideology; 
‘social blindness’; slow learning relative to fast change; out-of-date expert knowledge; and of inflexible 
information production functions; created major social and knowledge exposures amongst elite and 
operational agents in the MFI and financial system during the ‘dot.com’ period (Holland, 2002), in the 
Enron case (Healy and Palepu, 2003), and before the GFC of 2007-09 (Holland, 2010).  The combination 
of MFI social and knowledge problems shaped and structured information production and financial 
decision processes in very risky and private ways for MFI agents concerning the bank sector.  Pressures 
existed to only think and act within ‘established knowledge’ in the MFI. They inhibited change and 
created major knowledge, information and financial risk exposures to dramatic change during the 
‘dot.com’period and the crisis.   
     In Stones terms (2005) general knowledge, and specific knowledge as finance theory, were used by 
elite agents, at times to: transfer untested ideas; ignore relevant research; block the (rate of) development 
of expert knowledge by operational agents (Holland, 2010).  This appears to be a unique knowledge 
problem in the world of finance and MFI.  In the GFC the sudden unexpected change in banks and 
financial markets radically disrupted the cosy interactions and states in a previously stable MFI field 
context and agent ‘habitus’ (Bordieu, 1990) and disrupted MFI actors understanding of social and 
economic fields. Various economic and social factors intensified existing problems in the MFI and 
created a negative and destructive ‘innovation’ spiral (Merton, 1995). They distorted shared exchanges of 
information between agents and contributed to underperformance and failure of the MFI concerning the 
banking sector. The vulnerability of MFI actors: their growing awareness of these conditions; combined 
with dramatic events. This contributed to their complete loss of trust and confidence in: their relationships 
with others; what they knew about the world and events; and what they thought others knew. These were 
primary factors in MFI failures and associated capital market problems leading to the ‘dot.com’ and 
Enron price collapse, the Northern Rock bank run and the GFC.   Holland (2010) argued that  
‘The Lehmans failure corresponded to Weick’s (1988) idea of a ‘cosmology episode’, which arises when individuals, teams, 
organisations, and markets suddenly feel that the universe is no longer a rational, orderly system…key players in failing banks 
suffered both from this catastrophic event and, simultaneously lost the means to recover from it’.  
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9. Discussion and conclusions      
 
The paper has argued that regulators, academics, practitioners and others require a conceptual frame to 
respond to the many issues arising in the MFI. The conceptual frame proposed is based on a combination 
of empirical narrative and theoretical narrative. The ‘empirical narrative’ explored how the MFI was a 
core structure and mechanism for valuation, assurance and governance in the world of finance.  The 
‘theoretical narrative’ was developed by using theoretical sources to analyse the MFI in periods of 
stability, change, and major problems. 
The paper has used these narratives to illustrate how elite MFI agents exercised power over others 
through their social networks and hierarchical structures. Resources such as social network position, 
knowledge and finance sources were the basis for their power over use of knowledge and production of 
information. Many elite agents shared common economic interests, common ideas and ideology about 
how the finance system and the MFI should work. They shared a culture of secrecy living in a ‘bubble’ of 
finance isolated from other citizens. As insiders they shared a culture of wealth maximising, which 
became: a culture of bonuses, greed, risk taking with citizens’ resources (Turner, 2009, Kay, 2015)’  and 
indifference to outsider citizens (Jones, 2014). They used their collective resources: to resist change; to 
adapt to major problems; and to maintain their advantages.  The problems discussed in sections 7 and 8 
have proved to be very serious for the MFI, financial system and citizens.  
      As a result, the conceptual frame is required to develop: a critical stance; new policy prescriptions; 
and new regulation.  Actions involve: reform of social and economic structures; especially in 
(concentrated and elite) social and economic structures in the MFI.  They involve: making explicit: 
privately shared knowledge in MFI; change processes: and formal learning.  These changes together form 
a coherent means to control behavior in MFI and reduce risk of failure. They are required to deal with 
negative change and problems re-emerging in the MFI.  Change in the MFI also requires improved 
transparency and systemic changes in all economic, social and knowledge structures in the pursuit of 
fairness and social justice for all investors and citizens. In particular, there is a need to widen the ‘Overton 
window’ (Jones, 2014, p xviii) or what is ‘deemed politically possible at any given time’.   
 Developing coherent narratives and a critical stance  
In previous sections, sources such as Bourdieu (1990), Stones (2005), Merton (1995) and related literature 
were used to develop a new ‘theoretical narrative’ to interpret the MFI ‘empirical narrative’ and overcome 
problems in understanding the MFI.  This approach is consistent with Ahrens and Chapman (2006) 
argument that researchers should view qualitative field study as a theoretical activity (Jack and Kholeif, 
2007).  The analysis of MFI problems and related agent and parent firm problems suggests that such a 
theoretically grounded understanding of the MFI is a basis to develop and maintain a critical stance on 
ongoing MFI operations, change and problems. The use of concepts of ‘habitus’ from  Bordieu (1990), 
‘structuration’ from Stones (2005)and ideas of ‘performativity’ from Mackenzie (2006), and their 
application to the empirical phenomena can help develop and maintain this critical stance. If these sources 
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are combined with Merton’s (1995) idea of a financial innovation spiral then a new explicit means to 
critically appraise ongoing MFI operations, change and major problems, can be developed. This is superior 
to a world where many invisible MFI factors are allowed to have hidden, negative and unchallenged 
effects potentially leading to failure.  The following policy proposals for change in social structure and 
knowledge are intended to enhance that visibility, to improve accountability of MFI agents to wider civic 
society, and create a new and fairer public ‘battle’. 
Social structure policy changes 
        A new ‘magna carta’ is required to break up the power of ‘big barons’ or elite in the MFI and reduce 
secrecy. There is a need to break up the concentration of power in MFI social networks involving large 
companies, large banks, accounting firms, auditors, rating agencies, and  financial media. The 2009-2017 
debate about ‘breaking-up’ or ‘ring fencing’ specialist functions in the very largest conglomerate banks was 
primarily about systemic financial risk issues (TBTF) in banks and financial system. This paper argues that 
non financial systemic risks need to be considered. There are equally good information, knowledge,  and 
governance  reasons to break up the concentrated private social and economic structures for all such large 
firms to make the MFI a’ fair playing field’. There is precedent here with the: US break up of Universal banks 
in 1933;  UK price sensitive information legislation in 1993-94; US ‘fair disclosure’ act in 2000; SEC control 
over analyst bias in 2001; Financial reporting and governance changes post Enron; Arthur Andersen break up 
2002; Lehmans failure 2007; and banking changes post 2008. However, such changes have been fragmented 
relative to the larger financial system and the combined empirical and theoretical narrative of the MFI.  
       There is an associated need to make visible MFI social structure and knowledge at the levels of agents and 
firms. This requires more public information on many matters such as inter alia: overlapping directorships in 
the finance sector; agent movement across financial firms; cross equity holdings by elite agents; conflicts of 
interest; background and skill sets of directors and top management; and broad network ‘maps’ of information 
traffic between MFI agents. More public information is required on income, wealth and tax data for elite and 
operational agents in the MFI.  Given the problems, incentives, temptations and secrecy, those who are closest 
to the flows and resources of finance should have tougher not weaker disclosure and ethical behaviour 
standards. The ‘fig leaf’ camouflage of ‘caveat emptor’ and assumed ‘fairness’ effects of ‘efficient markets’ 
has to be removed and higher transparency established. Some progress has been made on these matters, but a 
more a coherent approach based on combined empirical and theoretical narratives is required to make the 
social networking, power, knowledge, and financial resources of MFI agents and the wider world of finance 
much more visible and open to accountability in civic society. Such ‘social and knowledge’ disclosure is as 
important as conventional corporate financial disclosure. This can stimulate a public debate about breaking up 
the concentration of power in large conglomerates and make private action and influence of elites more 
accountable.  
           Reform also requires a co-ordinated approach to change in: company disclosure; analyst research; and 
FM use of information. This could involve MFI regulators analysing ‘innovative’ information sources and 
financial transactions (and the firms creating them) for: spurious complexity; increased risk; poor links to the 
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‘real’ economy; and likely problems.  This could create disincentives for elites and conglomerate financial 
firms to use change processes to exploit the finance system in way that offers them positive financial gains 
whilst essentially extracting wealth from a fixed but diminishing public resource (Kay, 2015). Such 
operational change should be consistent with ideas of improved economic efficiency and of fairness relative to 
the wider investing public. As Mark Carney (2015), Governor of the Bank of England argued ‘Markets need to 
retain the consent of society – a social licence – to be allowed to operate, innovate and grow’. 
Knowledge and research based policy changes 
          Reform also requires a co-ordinated approach to change, learning, and knowledge creation by MFI 
practitioners and academics.  For practitioners, the change process in the MFI, and events such as GFC and 
post crisis period revealed how the lines between general and specific knowledge for MFI agents, and 
between various forms of specific knowledge (Stones, 2005), could change with learning. This situation 
has publicly challenged taken-for-granted views of the world of finance and MFI. Turner (2009) argued   
‘the crisis also raises important questions about the intellectual assumptions on which previous regulatory approaches have 
largely been built’ … ‘At the core of these assumptions has been the theory of efficient and rational markets. …these assumptions 
are now subject to extensive challenge on both theoretical and empirical grounds, with potential implications for..Regulation’ .       
 
       This suggests that literature on ‘organisational learning’ and knowledge creation could be used by 
regulators to influence the MFI change process.  Pedler et al, (1997) ideas on effective learning in large 
organisations; Merton’s (1995) ‘financial innovation spiral’ and the creation of expert knowledge;  could 
be the basis for ‘good practice’ guidance by regulators.   
         Changes to academic research and knowledge are also required.  Keasey and Hudson (2007) argue 
that finance theory is an academic ‘house without windows’. This paper provides examples how to open a 
finance theory research ‘window’ for researchers. However, for such changes to occur in the world of MFI 
research, and to take effect in the immediate future, also requires changes in the concentration of power in 
the world of academic finance. A new ‘magna carta’ is also required in academic finance concerning the 
prestigious US and EU universities and the top rated journals (Whitley, 1986; Hopwood, 2009; Gendron 
and Smith-Lacroix, 2013). There is a need to reduce their control over the appropriate theory base for 
understanding finance phenomena such as the MFI. The proposed adoption of new theory framework and 
critical stance is intended to support this. As Gendron and Smith-Lacroix(2013) argue that,  
 ‘ finance research has largely failed to invest in the promotion of paradigmatic diversity, and ..resist the idea…. finance's lack of 
diversity in research paradigms .. translates into a body of knowledge that presents important limitations when trying to make 
sense of ..phenomena, not least of which are infrequent but highly significant events unfolding in the political economy’  
 
    The above learning and research approaches can provide means to continuously enhance the empirical 
narratives and theoretical narratives outlined in the paper. 
Control of behaviour and avoiding crises 
      The paper argues that use of empirical and theoretical narrative, and ensuring their widespread use and 
continuing improvement, are ways to counter crisis conditions in MFI social networks and financial markets. 
Akerlof and Schiller (2009) suggest that in the world of finance new ideas and new psychological states 
spread like a new virus contagion or pandemic in a population without immunity. This contagion can be 
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seen as the basis for systemic risk in financial markets. Part of the solution to contagion and systemic risk 
lies with ‘immunization’ through prior knowledge (eg of MFI social structures and MFI firm business 
models) and continuous learning to break out of the ‘psychic prison’ (Morgan, 1986). It lies with reform 
of elite social structures and concentration of power.  The transmission of meaning, knowledge and 
stories in the MFI between elites (as established knowledge) and operational agents (as an established 
narrative) through contagion must be controlled. Historic ‘contagion’ such as during the ‘dot.com’ boom 
and Enron case (Healy & Palepu, 2003), and before and during the GFC (Holland, 2010), demonstrate 
how important this idea is. Learnt MFI constructs must be tested by deeper and more widely diffused 
knowledge (empirical, theoretical) at the point of knowledge and story transfer. ‘Immunization’ through 
learning and knowledge use must take effect at: management and operational levels in MFI firms; in 
wider MFI social networks; and MFI exchange mechanisms.  
      The proposed improved transparency and changes to social structure, knowledge and operations may prove 
difficult due to the lobbying power and political party financing power of ‘concentrated’ financial capital 
(Jones, 2014).  If limited and fragmented action continues to be taken by US, EU and other G20 politicians 
and regulatory authorities the same problems will re-emerge. Elites are likely to exploit fragmented change: 
via their social networks, knowledge, and power; for their own personal and elite group benefit (Gluckler, 
2013).  Given the concentration of elite power and the lack of critical frame, a public debate is unlikely to be 
initiated by elites in the MFI concerning knowledge of private social structures, power, and processes. This 
means that the next window of opportunity for change would be the next crisis and that ‘ideas lying around’ 
(Friedman (1982, preface) will be the basis to make ‘the politically impossible ….the politically inevitable’.  
However this paper argues that new ideas and policies can be developed and the ‘Overton window’ (Jones, 
2014) post GFC can be kept open.  The development of more complete and critical theoretical framework 
matched to empirical insights has been proposed as a key means to stimulate the debate and open up the 
private world of the MFI. 
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